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First Amendment Rights for Publishers 
and the Distribution of Unsolicited 
Magazines to Inmates 
 
Samantha Halpern* 
 
I. Introduction 
 
When Ray Hrdlicka decided to begin a magazine that focuses on 
distributing information about the criminal justice system, he asked 
himself, “What was the best mechanism for the information and how 
would it be delivered? The answer was obvious,” he said, “although not 
so simple.”1 He wanted to produce a magazine that was delivered to the 
people “who need it the most, when they need it the most, [and] where 
they need it the most.”2 Thus, his target audience was jail inmates and 
other people involved in the criminal justice system, including attorneys, 
law enforcement officials, court personnel, and friends and family on 
both sides of the law. 
The first edition of Crime, Justice and America (“CJA”) came out in 
May 2002 and by 2011, it was distributed in over seventy county jails 
across thirteen states.
3
 
 
CJA’s business model is fairly simple. It lures 
advertisers—usually bail bondsmen and lawyers—with 
the promise of a captive audience of thousands of 
inmates in immediate need of their services[,] . . . then . . 
. pressur[es] jail administrators to choose either leaving 
stacks of CJA in common areas or allowing individual 
 
  * J.D., Pace Law School, 2013; B.A., The University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill, 2010. The author wishes to thank her grandmother, Judge Rosalie B. Cooper, for 
being a constant source of inspiration and guidance. She also thanks her family and 
friends for their continuous support. 
1. Distribution of Crime, Justice & America Magazine, CRIME, JUST. & AM. (Feb. 
27, 2011) [hereinafter Distribution of Crime], available at 
http://crimejusticeandamerica.com/distribution-of-crime-justice-america-magazine. 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
1
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copies . . . to be mailed directly to inmates off of an 
inmate roster. Either way, every seven days enough 
copies [of the magazine] arrive at the targeted jails to 
ensure that at least one out of every ten inmates gets 
one.
4
 
 
While many jails allowed the direct distribution method,
5
 and some 
even praised it,
6
 the Sacramento County Jails and the Butte County Jails 
refused to facilitate the direct distribution scheme and only allowed CJA 
to be distributed to those inmates who requested it.
7
 The jails claimed 
that they refused to disseminate extra copies of the magazine to inmates 
who did not ask for them in an effort to minimize the risk of smuggled 
contraband and to reduce the amount of excess paper inmates could use 
to do things such as start fires or clog toilets.
8
 As a result, Hrdlicka filed 
suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming his First Amendment rights 
were violated by the mail policies at the jails that refused to distribute 
unsolicited copies to inmates.
9
 
This Article discusses whether inmates have a First Amendment 
interest in receiving unsolicited publications, and whether a publisher has 
a First Amendment interest in distributing unsolicited publications. Part 
II will discuss the history of prisoners’ First Amendment rights, 
specifically in relation to publications and communications, and how the 
standard for First Amendment violations of prisoner rights has evolved 
over time. Part III will focus on the Supreme Court case Turner v. 
Safley
10
 and how the test articulated in Turner applied to cases that 
followed.
11
 Part IV will address whether the Turner standard was the 
appropriate test to apply to whether publishers, and not inmates, have a 
First Amendment interest in distributing unsolicited publications, 
 
4. Hrdlicka v. Reniff, 656 F.3d 942, 944 (9th Cir. 2011), reh’g denied en banc, 631 
F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2010). 
5. This method involves leaving small stacks of the magazine in common areas of 
the jail. Distribution of Crime, supra note 1. 
6. Id. (“Fresno County jail . . . wrote an email praising the ‘direct distribution’ 
method.”). 
7. See Hrdlicka, 631 F.3d at 1047-48. 
8. Id. at 1051. 
9. Id. at 1048. 
10. 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
11. See Tanya Kessler, Purgatory Cannot Be Worse Than Hell: The First 
Amendment Rights of Civilly Committed Sex Offenders, 12 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 283, 296 
(2009). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss2/8
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specifically in reference to the Ninth Circuit case Hrdlicka v. Reniff.
12
 
The Supreme Court specifically stated that the Turner test was created 
“to formulate a standard of review for prisoners’ constitutional claims . . 
. .”13 In Hrdlicka, the publishers of CJA, and not the prisoners, 
commenced the action, and thus the Turner test should not apply. 
Furthermore, a substantial issue of material fact does not exist in 
Hrdlicka, and the Ninth Circuit should have affirmed summary 
judgment. The last section of Part IV will discuss the standard that 
should have been applied in Hrdlicka. 
 
II. Standards Applied by the Court Regarding Prisoners’ First 
Amendment Rights 
 
Criminal convictions and lawful imprisonment 
deprive citizens of their freedom and many other 
constitutional rights, but prisoners do retain some 
constitutional rights . . . . However, federal courts are 
[often] reluctant to interfere with the internal 
administration of prisons, and the judiciary accords 
wide-ranging deference to the “expert judgment” of 
prison officials.
14
 
 
The Supreme Court has stated that “prison administrators[,] . . . and 
not the courts, [are] to make the difficult judgments concerning 
institutional operations . . . .”15 Furthermore, “[p]rison management 
decisions ‘are peculiarly within the province and professional expertise 
of corrections officials, and, in the absence of substantial evidence in the 
record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their response to 
these considerations, courts should ordinarily defer to their expert 
judgment in such matters.’”16 
 
 
 
 
12. 631 F.3d 1044. 
13. Turner, 482 U.S. at 85. 
14. Substantive Rights Retained By Prisoners, 36 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 
948, 947 (2007) (footnotes omitted). 
15. Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 128 (1977). 
16. Aaron H. Caplan, Freedom of Speech in School and Prison, 85 WASH. L. REV. 
71, 89 (2010) (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974)). 
3
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Courts’ approaches to prisoners’ constitutional rights can be 
classified into three phases.
17
 Beginning in the 1930s, federal courts 
mainly adhered to the “hands-off” doctrine, “refusing to protect prisoners 
from constitutional violations, partly on the basis of federalism.”18 Lower 
federal courts supported the hands-off doctrine due to “judges’ lack of 
familiarity with prison life and . . . time consuming, frivolous . . . filings 
[that] clog[ged] the court.”19 “Between 1967 and 1977[,] the federal 
judiciary underwent a [dramatic] transformation” wherein it “abandoned 
the hands-off doctrine” and greatly expanded constitutional protections 
to many aspects of incarceration, including First Amendment rights and 
living conditions.
20
 Under Procunier v. Martinez,
21
 the standard for First 
Amendment violations of prisoner rights was that the regulation in 
question had to “further an important or substantial governmental interest 
unrelated to the suppression of expression,” and the limitation could be 
“no greater than is necessary” to protect the interest involved.22 This 
decision, however, was short lived. 
The shift from the protective stance toward prisoners in Martinez to 
more judicial deference to prison administrators was evident in Pell v. 
Procunier.
23
 The Court held that a prison regulation that did not allow 
media representatives to interview particular inmates and did not allow 
prisoners to initiate interviews did not unconstitutionally infringe on 
prisoners’ First Amendment rights, and the regulation did not amount to 
unconstitutional state interference with free press.
24
 The Court noted that 
“[a]lthough they would not permit prison officials to prohibit all 
expression or communication by prison inmates, security considerations 
are sufficiently paramount in the administration of the prison . . . .”25 
Thus, the judiciary began to provide prison administrators with more 
leeway in the way they ran the prisons. 
Through the 1970s, the judiciary continually applied extreme 
deferential prison standards toward prisoners’ constitutional rights, 
particularly their First Amendment rights. In the 1977 case Jones v. 
 
17. Kessler, supra note 11, at 295. 
18. Id. (citing James E. Robertson, The Rehnquist Court and the “Turnerization” of 
Prisoners’ Rights, 10 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 97, 99 (2006)). 
19. Robertson, supra note 18. 
20. Id. at 100. 
21. 416 U.S. 396 (1974). 
22. Id. at 413. This standard was similar to strict scrutiny. 
23. 417 U.S. 817 (1974). 
24. See id. at 834. 
25. Id. at 827. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss2/8
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North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., the Court noted that “First 
Amendment associational rights . . . must give way to the reasonable 
considerations of penal management.”26 Two years later, the Court held 
that “a prohibition against receipt of hardback books unless mailed 
directly from publishers, book clubs, or bookstores does not violate the 
First Amendment rights of . . . inmates.”27 The restriction, the Court said, 
was a response to an obvious security problem—smuggling contraband, 
such as money, drugs, and weapons, in the bindings of hardcover 
books.
28
 The Court cemented this shift away from the high-level scrutiny 
courts previously applied to infringements on prisoners’ constitutional 
rights with the 1987 Turner v. Safely
29
 decision, which established 
extreme judicial deference to prison administrators for prisoners’ First 
Amendment rights.
30
 
As evident from subsequent cases, the Court has moved to a more 
deferential standard when assessing prisoners’ rights. With regard to 
First Amendment rights, specifically the distribution of mail and books 
in prison, the Court is particularly concerned with safety issues. As such, 
over time, the Court has increasingly deferred to prison administrators to 
regulate and manage prisoners’ First Amendment rights. 
 
III. Turner v. Safley31 
 
Turner remains one of the most influential prisoners’ rights cases. 
The district court swayed from the standard set forth in Wolfish and 
“employed heightened scrutiny in finding unconstitutional prison 
regulations largely forbidding correspondence between inmates and 
barring inmate marriages.”32 The district court deemed inmate 
correspondence and marriage as fundamental rights
33
 and “barred 
 
26. Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 132 (1977). 
In Jones, where a prison inmates “labor union” brought suit challenging a prison 
regulation that prohibited delivery of packets of union publications mailed in bulk to 
prisoners for redistribution among other prisoners, the Court held that the possible 
detrimental effects of organizational activities of the union were sufficiently weighty to 
prevail against the prisoners’ First Amendment rights. Id. 
27. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 550 (1979). 
28. Id. at 551. 
29. 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
30. See Kessler, supra note 11, at 295. 
31. 482 U.S. 78. 
32. Robertson, supra note 18, at 103 (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 82-83). 
33. Turner v. Safley, 586 F. Supp. 589, 594-96 (W.D. Mo. 1984); Robertson, supra 
5
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limitations on their exercise unless they constituted the least-restrictive 
method to achieving penal goals.”34 The court of appeals used the same 
test and affirmed.
35
 Writing for the majority when the case reached the 
Supreme Court, Justice O’Connor stated, “a lesser standard of scrutiny is 
appropriate in determining the constitutionality of the prison rules[,]”36 
and thus rejected the strict scrutiny analysis applied by the lower courts. 
In place of heightened scrutiny, the Turner Court advanced a 
reasonableness standard.
37
 Thus, “when a prison regulation impinges on 
inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid [only] if it is 
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”38 To determine 
whether a regulation is reasonable, the court in Turner articulated a four-
factor test: first, whether the regulation is rationally related to a 
legitimate and neutral governmental objective;
39
 second, whether there 
are alternative avenues that remain open to exercise the right;
40
 third, 
“the impact [that] accommodati[ng] . . . the asserted . . . right will have 
on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources;
41
 
and fourth, whether the existence of easy and obvious alternatives 
indicates that the regulation is an exaggerated response by prison 
officials.
42
 The Court applied each of these factors to the two regulations 
and found that the prohibition on inmate-to-inmate mail was 
constitutional, as the regulation limited the potential to form escape plans 
and promote gang communication.
43
 Furthermore, the regulation passed 
the four factors articulated by the test, and the regulation did not 
unconstitutionally restrict inmates’ First Amendment rights.44 
 
 
 
 
 
note 18, at 103 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (“[T]he very 
essence of a scheme of ordered liberty.”). 
34. Robertson, supra note 18, at 104 (citing Turner, 586 F. Supp. at 594, 596). 
35. Safley v. Turner, 777 F.2d 1307, 1316 (8th Cir. 1985). 
36. Turner, 482 U.S. at 81. 
37. Id. at 89. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 90. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43. See id. at 91. 
44. See id. at 91-93. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss2/8
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A. Analysis of Turner Factors 
 
The test in Turner is clearly deferential toward prison 
administrators’ regulations. The Supreme Court, however, did not 
provide sufficient guidance as to how the Turner test should be applied.
45
 
The first factor states that there must be a “‘rational connection’ between 
the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put 
forward to justify it.”46 The “governmental objective must be a legitimate 
and neutral one[,]”47 which is a relatively “easy factor for prison officials 
to meet.”48 “The government’s interests in rehabilitating prisoners, prison 
security, [fire safety,] and even budgetary concerns” are a number of 
ways in which the government could satisfy this standard.
49
 As such, the 
first factor in the Turner test is generally easy for the government to 
satisfy. 
The second factor of the Turner test states: “[w]here ‘other avenues’ 
remain available for the exercise of the asserted right . . . courts should 
be particularly conscious of the ‘measure of judicial deference owed to 
corrections officials . . . in gauging the validity of the regulation.’”50 This 
prong, however, is vague, as it seems that “[a] court need not seek an 
alternative to the specific right, but may seek an alternative to the general 
right.”51 “Thus, a court may defer to prison administrators even where no 
alternative to the specific right exists.”52 Therefore, it appears there is 
some leeway in satisfying this factor of the test. 
The third factor of the test focuses on “the impact accommodation 
of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other 
inmates.”53 In addition, it also looks at the impact the asserted right will 
have on the allocation of resources in the prison.
54
 “When 
 
45. Melissa Rivero, Melting in the Hands of the Court: M&M’s, Art, and a 
Prisoner’s Right to Freedom of Expression, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 811, 828 (2008). See 
generally 1 MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 5:2, at 595-99 (3d ed. 2002) 
(providing additional information on the Turner case). 
46. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89 (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 
(1984)). 
47. Id. at 90. 
48. Rivero, supra note 45, at 828. 
49. Id. 
50. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90 (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974)). 
51. Rivero, supra note 45, at 828-29. 
52. Id. at 829. 
53. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. 
54. Id. 
7
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accommodation of an asserted right will have a significant ‘ripple effect,’ 
. . . courts . . . [are advised to] be particularly deferential to the informed 
discretion of corrections officials.”55 Despite the similarity in the 
reasonableness analysis between the first and third factors, the third 
prong focuses on the regulation’s reasonableness with regard to “the 
plaintiff’s proposed alternative for operating the prison.”56 
Lastly, the fourth factor considers whether the prison regulation is 
unreasonable and “an ‘exaggerated response’ to prison concerns.”57 “The 
plaintiff bears the burden of suggesting an alternative[;]”58 the 
alternative, however, need not be the least restrictive avenue.
59
 “An 
inmate must show that an obvious, easy alternative exists and th[us], . . . 
the regulation is an overreaction to prison administrators’ concern.”60 
Moreover, if the proposed alternative is likely to create a “ripple effect” 
and thus, creates negative repercussions in other areas of prison 
administration, then the alternative is unlikely to withstand judicial 
scrutiny.
61
 With the introduction of the Turner test, courts became more 
deferential to prison administrators. The prongs of the test were 
somewhat vague, but future cases provided some interpretation of the 
four-prong test. Nonetheless, it was clear the court was shifting toward a 
more lenient approach as to how jail administrators regulated their 
prisons. 
 
B. Turner Test Applied to Distribution of Literature 
 
“[M]embers of the Turner majority envisaged a test governing all 
rights implicated by prison regulations.”62 Quickly following the Turner 
ruling, “the Court applied the . . . test to prison regulations addressing 
two other aspects of the First Amendment:”63 religious practices64 and 
receipt of books.
65
 The Court in Thornburgh v. Abbott
66
 reviewed the 
 
55. Id. 
56. Rivero, supra note 45, at 829 (citing MUSHLIN, supra note 45, at 36). 
57. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. 
58. Rivero, supra note 45, at 829 (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 90-91). 
59. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 90-91. 
60. Rivero, supra note 45, at 829 (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 90-91). 
61. Id. (citing MUSHLIN, supra note 45, at 35-36). 
62. Robertson, supra note 18, at 105. 
63. Id. 
64. O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987); Robertson, supra note 18, at 
105. 
65. Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989); Robertson, supra note 18, at 105. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss2/8
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Federal Bureau of Prisons regulations that governed the censorship of 
publications sent to inmates; inmates can generally receive materials, but 
the warden may reject material according to specific criteria.
67
 Using the 
reasonableness standard from Turner, the Court in Abbott held that 
wardens may reject publications sent to inmates if they are deemed 
“detrimental to the security, good order, or discipline of the institution or 
if it might facilitate criminal activity.”68 The difference between the 
Turner and Abbott cases is that in Turner the inmate correspondence 
regulation implicated only the rights of prisoners and did not affect non-
prisoners. In Abbott, however, the regulation implicated the rights of 
nonprisoners, specifically publishers who wished to communicate with 
inmates. Thus, although the Turner test was not immediately applied to 
prisoners’ rights, it provided a standard to address prisoners’ religious 
practices and the receipt of books. 
 
C. The Ninth Circuit 
 
Federal courts have repeatedly applied the Turner test to prisoners’ 
First Amendment rights. The Ninth Circuit, in particular, “ha[s] applied 
the Turner test [to] four cases involving the distribution of literature to 
inmates.”69 In each case, the Ninth Circuit held that “prison policies[, 
which] placed restrictions on the distribution of gift and solicited 
publications[,]” were unconstitutional.70 In Crofton v. Roe,71 the Ninth 
Circuit “struck down a regulation that prohibited a prisoner from 
receiving a book that [was] ordered for him by his stepfather.”72 The 
Court stated that the state failed to offer any justification for a blanket 
ban on the receipt of all gift publications.
73
 A few years later, the Ninth 
Circuit struck down a ban on bulk-rate mail as applied to non-profit 
publications.
74
 The court noted that “the receipt of such unobjectionable 
mail [does not] implicate penological interests.”75 In Morrison v. Hall,76 
 
66. 490 U.S. 401. 
67. See Stacey A. Miness, Pornography Behind Bars, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1702, 
1714-15 (2000) (quoting Abbott, 490 U.S. at 403). 
68. Abbott, 490 US at 404. 
69. Hrdlicka v. Reniff, 631 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir. 2011). 
70. Id. 
71. 170 F.3d 957, 960 (9th Cir. 1999). 
72. Hrdlicka, 631 F.3d at 1050 (citing Crofton, 170 F.3d at 960-61). 
73. Crofton, 170 F.3d at 960. 
74. See Prison Legal News v. Cook, 238 F.3d 1145, 1151 (9th Cir. 2001). 
75. Hrdlicka, 631 F.3d at 1050 (quoting Prison Legal News, 238 F.3d at 1149). 
9
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the Ninth Circuit struck down a regulation applied to “pre-paid, for-
profit, subscription publications,” and noted that the government did not 
provide any evidence regarding how the impact of processing the 
publications would impact prison resources.
77
 Lastly, the Ninth Circuit 
cut down a prison ban on “non-subscription bulk mail” in the 2005 case 
Prison Legal News v. Lehman.
78
 As evident from precedent, the Ninth 
Circuit has continuously applied the Turner test to prisoners’ rights, and 
in doing so, has expanded prisoners’ First Amendment rights, 
particularly regarding the distribution of publications. 
 
IV. Hrdlicka v. Reniff79 
 
The Ninth Circuit notoriously interferes with the administration of 
prisons.
80
 Thus, it did not come as a surprise when the Ninth Circuit held 
that county jail prisoners have the right to receive unsolicited copies of 
CJA.
81
 The quarterly magazine informs, explains, entertains, interprets, 
uncovers, and questions relevant issues in the criminal justice system, 
and between 2002 and 2011, fourteen editions of the magazine were 
published, totaling over one million copies.
82
 When Sacramento County 
and Butte County sheriffs refused to distribute the magazine at their 
county jails,
83
 Ray Hrdlicka, the publisher of CJA, and CJA filed federal 
lawsuits against them.
84
 The sheriffs countered that an increase in the 
number of publications and papers in their jails led to security 
concerns.
85
 
 
 
 
76. 261 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2001). 
77. Id. at 898. 
78. 397 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2005) (involving publications that inmates requested but 
for which they do not pay). 
79. 631 F.3d 1044. 
80. See Hrdlicka v. Reniff, 656 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2011), 9TH CIR. WATCH (Oct. 13, 
2011, 8:22 PM), http://blog.the9thcircuitwatch.com/search?q=hrdlicka [hereinafter 9TH 
CIRCUIT WATCH]. 
81. Hrdlicka, 631 F.3d at 1055. 
82. See id. at 1046-47. 
83. Id. at 1048. Both jails had policies that limited the amount of written materials 
inmates can keep in their cells. Id. at 1047-48. In Sacramento jails, an inmate may keep 
up to one newspaper, five periodicals, and five soft-covered books in his cell at any given 
time. Id. at 1047. 
84. Id. at 1046. 
85. Id. at 1051-52. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss2/8
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Prison officials from the two counties filed summary judgment 
motions.
86
 The district court granted summary judgment to both Sheriff 
McGuiness and Sheriff Reniff under the Turner test.
87
 Hrdlicka timely 
appealed and the court of appeals reviewed the order de novo.
88
 Viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to Hrdlicka and CJA, a divided 
three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the 
order for summary judgment and held “publishers and inmates have a 
First Amendment interest in communicating with each other.”89 
Furthermore, the majority held that “[a] First Amendment interest in 
distributing and receiving information does not depend on a recipient’s 
prior request for that information.”90 The majority applied the Turner test 
and found the jails’ response to the distribution of the unsolicited 
magazine may have been exaggerated.
91
 When “[a] judge of the court 
called for a vote on the petitions for rehearing en banc[,] . . . [a single] 
question [was] presented . . . : Does the four-factor test of Turner . . . 
apply to distribution of a magazine to county jail inmates who have not 
requested it?”92 “A vote was taken, and a majority of the active judges of 
the court failed to vote for en banc rehearing[;]”93 however, eight judges 
dissented.
94
 Concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc, Justices 
Reinhardt and Fletcher stressed that just because “the publication was 
unsolicited does not make the Turner test inapplicable.”95 In fact, the 
Justices noted that the Ninth Circuit previously “applied Turner to 
evaluate a regulation banning [the] distribution of requested but ‘non-
subscription bulk mail.’”96 As such, the denial of an en banc hearing 
meant summary judgment was reversed. 
 
 
 
 
 
86. Id. at 1047. 
87. Id. at 1047-48. 
88. Id. at 1048. 
89. Id. at 1049. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 1054-55. 
92. Hrdlicka v. Reniff, 656 F.3d 942, 942-43 (9th Cir. 2011), reh’g denied en banc, 
631 F.3d 1044. 
93. Id. 
94. See id. at 943. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. (citing Prison Legal News v. Lehman, 397 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2005)). 
11
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A. Majority 
 
The majority in Hrdlicka v. Reniff
97
 repeatedly emphasized that the 
Turner test was the proper standard by which to assess whether the 
prisoners’ constitutional rights were violated.98 The majority held that 
neither defendant was entitled to summary judgment, and thus reversed 
the district courts’ orders granting summary judgment.99 In reaching their 
decision, the majority first analyzed whether any First Amendment 
interest was implicated.
100
 After concluding First Amendment interests 
were present, it applied the four-factor Turner test to determine whether 
the jails’ policies violated the prisoners’ First Amendment rights.101 The 
court determined that the defendants did not justify banning the 
unsolicited distribution of CJA to county jail inmates.
102
 
 
1. First Amendment Interest 
 
The first step in the majority’s analysis was to determine whether 
any First Amendment right was implicated.
103
 If such rights were 
implicated, the court would then apply the four-factor Turner test. The 
court in Thornburgh v. Abbott
104
 applied the same two-step analysis and 
held that with regard to First Amendment rights, “publishers who wish to 
communicate with those who, through subscription, willingly seek their 
point of view have a legitimate First Amendment interest in access to 
prisoners.”105 The majority in Hrdlicka noted that the Ninth Circuit has 
“repeatedly recognized that publishers and inmates have a First 
Amendment interest in communicating with each other.”106 Furthermore, 
the majority stated that “[a] First Amendment interest in distributing and 
receiving information does not depend on a recipient’s prior request for 
that information”107 and pointed to the holding in Martin v. City of 
 
97. 631 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2011). 
98. See id. at 1051-55. 
99. Id. at 1055. 
100. Id. at 1048. 
101. See id. at 1049-56. 
102. Id. at 1055. 
103. Id. at 1048. 
104. 490 U.S. 401 (1989). 
105. Id. at 408. 
106. Hrdlicka, 631 F.3d at 1049; see, e.g., Prison Legal News v. Lehman, 397 F.3d 
692, 699 (9th Cir. 2005); accord Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 408. 
107. Hrdlicka, 631 F.3d at 1049. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss2/8
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Struthers,
108
 which held that “a municipal ordinance that made it 
unlawful to go door to door distributing handbills, circulars, or 
advertisements” was unconstitutional.109 Thus, the majority in Hrdlicka 
found that “publisher[s] ha[ve] a First Amendment interest in 
distributing[] and inmates have a First Amendment interest in receiving[] 
unsolicited publications” of CJA.110 
 
2. Turner Application 
 
Following the determination that both inmates and publishers have 
First Amendment interests in the distribution and collection of CJA, the 
majority applied the four-step Turner test to evaluate the reasonableness 
of the prison regulation and decide whether it violated constitutional 
rights.
111
 The majority maintains that the Supreme Court and Ninth 
Circuit “have consistently applied the Turner test to determine whether 
various forms of written communication with inmates are protected by 
the First Amendment.”112 The Turner test has been applied to “individual 
challenges to prison or jail regulations forbidding various forms of 
written communications[,]”113 and the majority found that “the fact that 
the publication [in Hrdlicka] was unsolicited does not make the Turner 
test inapplicable.”114 Thus, the majority held that the Turner test was the 
proper standard by which to evaluate whether First Amendment rights 
were violated. 
The first step of the Turner test is to determine whether the prison 
regulation is rationally related to a legitimate penological objective.
115
 
Should “the prison fail[] to show . . . the regulation is rationally related to 
a legitimate penological objective, [the court] do[es] not consider the 
other factors[;]”116 however, if the regulation is rationally related, the 
court assesses the three other prongs.
117
 Officers at the Sacramento and 
Butte County Jails asserted various reasons for the prison regulations: jail 
 
108. 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943). 
109. Hrdlicka, 631 F.3d at 1049 (citing Martin, 319 U.S. at 143). 
110. Id. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. at 1050. 
113. Id. at 1051. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
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security, staff resources, slippery slope, and interference with existing 
advertising.
118
 
Officers at the jails were concerned with the effect an influx of 
publications would have on jail security.
119
 By refusing to allow 
unsolicited copies of CJA, the officers maintained it would “reduc[e] the 
likelihood of contraband entering the jail, . . . reduc[e] the risk of fires[,] 
and enable[e] efficient cell searches.”120 Furthermore, they also asserted 
that the policies promoted security because unsolicited publications were 
more likely to be used for “‘nefarious purposes’ such as blocking lights 
or clogging toilets.”121 Thus, the officers argued the policies were 
reasonable to protect the security interests of inmates and general 
regulation within the jail. 
The majority was unconvinced that by permitting unsolicited copies 
of CJA, there would be heightened security concerns at the jail.
122
 The 
Sacramento County jail previously received unsolicited copies of the 
Sacramento Bee and USA Today but halted delivery of both publications 
for reasons other than security concerns.
123
 Furthermore, “Lieutenant 
Bryan Flicker of the Butte County jail stated in his declaration that 
inmates at th[e] jail already have access to paper that they use for 
improper purposes[,]”124 and he failed to point out how and “whether 
distribution of CJA was likely to increase the rate of such use of paper by 
inmates.”125 As such, the majority concluded that the jails failed to 
establish whether distribution of CJA in the jails “would produce 
additional clutter in inmates [sic] cells or otherwise adversely affect jail 
security.”126 
Jail officers gave other reasons to justify their policies. First, 
officers expressed concern that by allowing delivery of unsolicited 
copies of CJA, additional staff and time would be required to sort 
through the mail publications.
127
 Officer Fox of the Sacramento County 
Jail stated “[a] total of twenty-four . . . personnel hours are used per day 
 
118. Id. at 1051-53. 
119. Id. at 1051. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
123. See id. 
124. Id. at 1052. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. 
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on mail related duties at the [j]ail.”128 The majority found, however, that 
“[n]either jail . . . suggested that unsolicited publications are more 
difficult to inspect and deliver than solicited publications[,]”129 and each 
failed to show how many additional hours would be required if 
unsolicited copies of CJA were delivered.
130
 Thus, the majority was 
unconvinced with this argument. 
The next argument the officers presented to prove the regulations 
were rationally related to a legitimate penological objective was that 
should the jails accept unsolicited publications of CJA, there would be an 
influx of other unsolicited publications.
131
 Furthermore, the Butte County 
Jail, in particular, wanted to “maintain control over advertising of bail in 
the jail” and distributing unsolicited copies of CJA would be inconsistent 
with existing advertising contracts.
132
 The majority, however, was 
unimpressed with both arguments. As per the slippery slope, the majority 
stated that the jail “did not present any evidence about other requests to 
distribute unsolicited mail.”133 Additionally, as per interference with 
existing advertising, the majority held that a jail does not have “a 
legitimate penological interest . . . in protecting a profit made by 
impinging on inmates’ First Amendment rights.”134 Since the prisons did 
not fail to show the regulation are not rationally related to legitimate 
penological factors, the majority assessed the remaining three factors in 
the Turner test.
135
 
The second element of the Turner test is whether there are other 
avenues available to exercise the asserted right.
136
 The “[d]efendants 
argue that CJA has alternative avenues to communicate with inmates 
because the jails will distribute CJA to inmates who request it.”137 The 
majority conceded, however, that there is a question of fact as to whether 
CJA publishers can effectively reach inmates if they can only reach them 
 
128. Id. 
129. Id. at 1053. 
130. Id. at 1052-53. 
131. Id. at 1053. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. (“Butte County jail has a contract with Partners for a Safer America, Inc. 
(‘PSA’), under which PSA operates bulletin boards in the jail on which bail bond agents 
are allowed to post advertisements. PSA pays the jail a percentage of its profits from its 
sale of advertising space on the bulletin boards.”). 
135. Id. at 1053-55. 
136. Id. (quoting Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 90 (1987)). 
137. Id. at 1053-54. 
15
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upon request.
138
 In addition, although inmates have access to the yellow 
pages and television, many inmates leave the jail before they learn that 
CJA exists, have time to request it, and then ultimately receive it.
139
 
Thus, the majority concluded there is a material issue of fact as to 
whether there are other avenues available.
140
 
The third element of the Turner test is the “impact accommodation 
of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, 
and on the allocation of prison resources generally.”141 “When 
accommodation of an asserted right will have a significant ‘ripple effect’ 
on fellow inmates or on prison staff, courts should be particularly 
deferential to the informed discretion of corrections officials.”142 
Plaintiffs stated they are willing to work with the jail officials to make 
the distributions easy and efficient, but there are issues as to the degree to 
which the jails would need to expend additional resources to 
accommodate the publishers. Officers, however, did not explain how 
mail inspectors would distinguish between unsolicited and requested 
copies of CJA, and thus, a ban on unsolicited copies could actually 
consume more prison resources than otherwise.
143
 Therefore, a question 
of material fact exists to the impact of accommodating the right to 
distribute the unsolicited copies of CJA. 
The fourth and final element of the Turner test is 
 
whether the existence of easy and obvious alternatives 
indicates that the regulation is an exaggerated response 
by prison officials. This is not a “least restrictive 
alternative” test: prison officials do not have to set up 
and then shoot down every conceivable alternative 
method of accommodating the claimant’s constitutional 
complaint. “[A]n alternative that fully accommodates the 
[asserted] rights at de minimis cost to valid penological 
interests suggests that the regulation does not satisfy the 
reasonable relationship standard.”144 
 
 
138. Id. at 1054. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. at 1053-54. 
141. Id. at 1054 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 90). 
142. Id. (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 90). 
143. Id. 
144. Id. at 1054-55 (citations omitted). 
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“The undisputed fact that CJA is . . . distributed in more than [sixty] 
counties throughout [thirteen] states . . . suggests that the [jails’] 
responses . . . may be exaggerated.”145 Furthermore, the jail has not 
pointed to any procedures by which they can mitigate the drain on jail 
resources.
146
 Thus, taking all four Turner factors into consideration with 
the fact that First Amendment interests are implicated in the case, the 
majority held that neither defendant is entitled to summary judgment.
147
 
 
B. Dissent 
 
The dissent in Hrdlicka found that there is not an issue of material 
fact and would uphold the district court’s order granting summary 
judgment to the defendants.
148
 The dissent focuses on one important 
aspect: there have been no prisoner requests for access to CJA.
149
 The 
dissent concedes that the Ninth Circuit has found that the First 
Amendment guarantees Hrdlicka access to prisoners who have requested 
the magazine, but none have requested it.
150
 Furthermore, the dissent 
argues that “there is no precedent suggesting that the First Amendment 
guarantees Hrdlicka the special right to sue any sheriff[, jail, or officer] 
who refuses to be a de facto distribut[or] . . . of the CJA.”151 
“Prisons are not public fora.”152 Instead, the court points out, prisons 
are one of the few “public institutions which do not perform speech-
related functions at all . . . [where] the government is free to exclude 
even peaceful speech and assembly which interferes in any way with the 
functioning of those organizations.”153 Prisons are built for security 
purposes and to punish and deter criminal activity.
154
 Since prisons are 
not public fora, and speech can be suppressed in certain instances, the 
dissent argues that prisons should be able to restrict the distribution of 
unsolicited copies of CJA. 
 
 
145. Id. at 1055. 
146. See id. 
147. Id. 
148. See id. at 1055-58 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
149. Id. at 1055-56. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. at 1056. 
152. Id. (citing United States v. Douglass, 579 F.2d 545, 549 (9th Cir. 1978)). 
153. Id. 
154. Id. 
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The dissent states that “[t]he majority’s [proposition] that ‘Turner 
addresses’ any ‘concerns’ regarding the difference between public fora 
and prisons[] is unavailing.”155 The Supreme Court in Turner stated that 
the Court’s task was to “formulate a standard of review for prisoners’ 
constitutional claims . . . .”156 The dissent argues that since the publishers 
are the aggrieved party, and no prisoner has brought a claim alleging his 
or her constitutional rights have been violated, there are no First 
Amendment rights implicated.
157
 As such, since there are no prisoners’ 
constitutional claims, the Turner test should not be applied.
158
 
Lastly, the dissent argues that the media has “no constitutional right 
of access to prisons or their inmates beyond that afforded the general 
public.”159 “Just as the press has no [constitutional] right of access to 
prison[ers,]” publishers distributing their magazines to inmates do not 
have a constitutional right of access.
160
 “Hrdlicka has no special right to 
demand a sheriff accept one of his chosen methods of distribution, 
especially given that a prison is not a public forum.”161 Hrdlicka can use 
other avenues to distribute and advertise his magazine and inform 
inmates about his publication.
162
 Thus, prisons should be able to restrict 
the distribution of unsolicited copies of CJA, and summary judgment 
awarded to the defendants should be affirmed.
163
 
 
C. Improper Outcome and Turner Application 
 
The Ninth Circuit has continuously interfered with the 
administration of prisons.
164
 As such, “The Supreme Court has 
repeatedly reversed [Nin]th Circuit expansion of prison inmates 
substantive rights beyond their scope . . . .”165 In Hrdlicka v. Reniff, the 
Ninth Circuit continued its trend in interfering with the administration of 
prisons and held that the prisons did not justify banning the unsolicited 
 
155. Id. (citations omitted). 
156. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 85 (1987)). 
157. Id. 
158. See id. at 1057. 
159. Id. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. 
162. See id. 
163. Id. at 1058. 
164. 9TH CIRCUIT WATCH, supra note 80. 
165. Id. 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss2/8
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copies of CJA to county jail members.
166
 Furthermore, it held prisoners 
have a right to receive such unsolicited copies, and Hrdlicka, the 
publisher, has a right to send them.
167
 The Ninth Circuit, however, 
applied the Turner test, which was the incorrect standard. Not only does 
the holding from the Turner Court specifically apply to prisoners’ 
constitutional claims, and not publishers claims, but it is also material 
that prisons are not public fora.
168
 In addition, the Supreme Court has 
continually deferred prison administration issues to the prisons,
169
 and 
the press does not have a constitutional right of access to prisons and 
prison inmates.
170
 As such, summary judgment in favor of the prisons 
should not have been reversed, and the Turner test should not have been 
applied. 
 
1. Turner Test Is Incorrect Standard 
 
The Turner test is the incorrect standard to apply as to whether 
Hrdlicka has a right to distribute non-solicited copies of CJA to inmates. 
In Turner, a class action was brought by “persons who either are or may 
be confined to the Renz Correctional Center and who desire to 
correspond with inmates at other Missouri correctional facilities.”171 
Furthermore, the Court in Turner specifically stated that their task was to 
“formulate a standard of review for prisoners’ constitutional claims that 
is responsive both to the ‘policy of judicial restraint regarding prisoner 
complaints and [to] the need to protect constitutional rights.’”172 As such, 
the Turner Court held that regulations within the jail relating to inmate 
marriages were unconstitutional, while regulations regarding inmate-to-
inmate correspondence were constitutional since they related to 
legitimate security concerns.
173
 Most importantly, however, is that fact 
 
166. Hrdlicka, 631 F.3d at 1046. 
167. Id. at 1049. 
168. Id. at 1056 (Smith, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Douglass, 579 F.2d 
545, 549 (9th Cir. 1978)). 
169. Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 128 
(1977) (“[P]rison administrators[,] . . . and not the courts, [are] to make the difficult 
judgments concerning institutional operations . . . .”). 
170. Hrdlicka, 631 F.3d at 1057 (Smith J., dissenting) (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 
U.S. 817 (1974)). 
171. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 82 (1987). 
172. Id. at 85 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Procunier v. 
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 406 (1987)). 
173. Id. at 99. 
19
HALPERN Macro Final 7/26/2013 4:49 PM 
814 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:2 
that the holding referred to prisons’ constitutional claims and judicial 
restraint concerning prisoners’ complaints. 
In Hrdlicka, Ray Hrdlicka, the publisher of CJA, brought claims 
asserting he and the publication have a First Amendment right to 
distribute unsolicited copies of CJA to prison inmates.
174
 Hrlicka is not a 
prison inmate. CJA is also not a prison inmate. No prison inmates 
brought claims asserting their First Amendment rights were violated 
when the prisons refused to distribute unsolicited copies of CJA. As 
such, it is evident that Turner is not the proper test to apply since the 
issue and holding in Turner pertained solely to prisoners’ constitututional 
claims and complaints. Since there are no prisoner constitutional claims 
at issue in Hrdlicka, the Ninth Circuit should not have applied the four-
step Turner test. 
 
2. Prisons Are Not Public Fora 
 
Prisons are not public fora.
175
 A public forum is an area where the 
government cannot regulate speech-related conduct except in narrow, 
non-discriminatory ways shown to be essential in serving significant 
governmental interests.
176
 At one end of the spectrum and most protected 
from any form of regulation are areas such as public streets and parks.
177
 
At the other and least shielded from regulation, however, are places such 
as hospitals, military bases, and prisons. In such places as those least 
shielded from regulation, the government is free to exclude even 
peaceful speech and assembly, which interferes with the functioning of 
that particular institution.
178
 
Butte and Sacramento prisons, the defendants in Hrdlicka, are 
within the category of places that are least shielded from speech 
regulations. Jails can exclude speech that interferes with the functioning 
of the prison. Since an influx of CJA will create security concerns within 
the jails,
179
 prisons should be permitted to restrict it. Furthermore, as jails 
 
174. Hrdlicka, 631 F.3d at 1046. 
175. Id. at 1056 (Smith, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Douglass, 579 F.2d 
545, 549 (9th Cir. 1978)). 
176. Douglass, 579 F.2d at 548; see generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 688-93 (1978); Harry Kalven Jr., The Concept of the Public 
Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 1. 
177. Douglass, 579 F.2d at 549. 
178. Id. 
179. But see Hrdlicka, 631 F.3d at 1052 (holding jails failed to establish whether 
distribution of CJA in the jails “would produce additional clutter in inmates [sic] cells or 
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are not public fora, it should be within the prisons’ discretion as to 
whether CJA should be allowed. 
 
3. Deference to Prisons 
 
The courts should be deferential to prison administrators and prison 
regulations. “[B]ecause the ‘problems of prisons in America are complex 
and intractable,’ and because courts are . . . ‘ill equipped’ to deal with 
these problems, [the Supreme Court] generally ha[s] deferred to the 
judgments of prison officials in upholding these regulations against 
constitutional challenge.”180 “[U]nder Turner and its predecessors, prison 
officials are to remain the primary arbiters of the problems that arise in 
prison management.”181 In Shaw v. Murphy, the Supreme Court held that 
“[s]eeking to avoid ‘unnecessarily perpetuat[ing] the involvement of the 
federal courts in affairs of prison administration, [the Court] reject[s] an 
alteration of the Turner analysis that would entail additional federal-
court oversight.”182 As such, the court should defer to decisions of prison 
officials when deciding whether unsolicited copies of CJA can be 
distributed. 
By reversing summary judgment and disallowing prison officials to 
uphold their regulations, the Ninth Circuit is violating the separation of 
powers doctrine. 
 
Prisons are creatures of the legislative and executive 
branches [of government], . . . so deference should be 
afforded [to the prisons] out of respect for the separation 
of powers. Where state prisons are involved, federal 
courts should defer for reasons of federalism. Or when 
push comes to shove, managing prisons is simply not the 
court’s job.183 
 
 
otherwise adversely affect jail security”). 
180. Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 229 (2001) (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 
416 U.S. 396, 404-05 (1974)). 
181. Id. at 230 (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987)). 
182. Id. at 230-31 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89). “If courts were permitted to 
enhance constitutional protection based on their assessments of the content of the 
particular communications, courts would be in a position to assume a greater role in 
decisions affecting prison administration.” Id. 
183. Caplan, supra note 16, at 90-91 (footnotes omitted). 
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Nonetheless, it is evident that prison administration should be left to 
prisons and the officials who work there. As such, the regulations in 
Butte and Sacramento jails disallowing the distribution of unsolicited 
publications of CJA to inmates violates the separation of powers 
doctrine, and the courts should defer to prison officials. 
 
4. The Press Has No Constitutional Right to Access Prisons 
 
The First Amendment prohibits the making of any law that abridges 
the freedom of speech and infringes on the right of the press.
184
 These 
rights, however, are not absolute, and limitations exist. One such 
limitation is the right of the press to access prison inmates. 
 
It has generally been held that the First Amendment does 
not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special 
access to information not available to the public 
generally. . . . [T]he press is regularly [denied access to] 
grand jury proceedings, [court] conferences, [and] the 
meetings of other official bodies gathering in executive 
session . . . . [Furthermore, the press] ha[s] no 
constitutional right of access to the scenes of crime or 
disaster when the general public is excluded.
185
 
 
Thus, it is evident that the Constitution can limit such rights of the press, 
and there is no constitutional duty to make available to journalists 
sources of information not available to the members of the public 
generally. 
Just as the press has no special right of access to prisons, Hrdlicka 
has no special right of access to demand that unsolicited publications of 
CJA be distributed to inmates. As discussed earlier, a prison is not a 
public forum.
186
 Thus, a content neutral method for sheriffs to ensure 
efficient administration of their facilities is allowed. Furthermore, 
Hrdlicka has other avenues by which he can distribute CJA.
187
 First, he 
“can advertise . . . in . . . the jail in an effort to convince inmates . . . to 
 
184. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
185. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 833-34 (1974) (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 
408 U.S. 665, 684-85 (1972)). 
186. See supra text accompanying notes 175-79. 
187. Hrdlicka v. Reniff, 631 F.3d 1044, 1057 (2011) (Smith, J., dissenting). 
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request his publication.
188
 Second, if he advertises in the jail, it is likely 
that prisoners will begin to discuss the magazine, and as a result, more 
prisoners will become aware of the publication and also request it. 
Although advertising is more costly than sending undistributed copies of 
CJA to prisons, “in the context of prisons, losing ‘cost advantages does 
not fundamentally implicate free speech values.’”189 As such, Hrdlicka 
cannot use the First Amendment to demand access to the prison inmates, 
and even though that may be the most cost effective procedure for the 
publication, cost advantages does not implicate free speech and press 
values.
190
 
As discussed, the Turner test was the improper standard to apply to 
the question of whether or not publishers have a First Amendment right 
to distribute unsolicited copies of CJA to prison inmates. In Hrdlicka, 
there were no prisoners’ claims regarding violations of their 
constitutional rights. Therefore, the Turner test should not have been 
applied. In addition, summary judgment should have been affirmed in 
favor of the defendants. Since prisons are not public forums, there is no 
constitutional right of access to prisoners, and courts should be 
deferential to prison administrators and regulations. 
 
D. Test that Should Be Applied 
 
Since the Turner test was the incorrect test to apply in Hrdlicka, a 
different standard should be set forth. The test to decide whether a prison 
regulation violates a publisher’s First Amendment rights should be: 1) 
does the prison regulation serve an important government objective; and 
2) is the regulation narrowly tailored? This is somewhat similar to the 
time, place, and manner restrictions, which have been upheld by the 
Supreme Court as constitutional restrictions on free speech. Since prisons 
are not public fora, however, the test is more stringent and does not 
include the “alternate channels of communication” and “content neutral” 
prongs. Furthermore, the test does not include the “content neutral” 
prong because it is necessary for prisons to censure certain topical 
publications that are sent to prisoners. Such topics include descriptions of 
how to build and use weapons, or how to escape from prisons. 
 
188. Id. 
189. Id. at 1057 (quoting Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 
U.S. 119, 130-31 (1977)). 
190. See id. 
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The aforementioned test includes only the two listed factors because 
the courts should be deferential to prison administrators. As discussed 
earlier, prisons are created and governed by the legislative and executive 
branches.
191
 Courts should be deferential to their regulations. In addition, 
prison administrators are familiar with the problems that arise in their 
facilities, particularly the issues that exist when there are influxes of 
paper and publications floating around prisons. Therefore, prison 
officials should be the individuals who decide how best to regulate 
inmates and prisons. The two-part test places some restrictions on the 
amount of power such prison officials can exercise; the test, however, 
does lean in favor of prison administrators. 
Accordingly, courts should use the aforementioned test to determine 
whether a prison regulation violates a publisher’s First Amendment 
rights. If the test had been applied in Hrdlicka, the regulation would have 
passed constitutional muster since the defendants stated several 
important government objectives for disallowing unsolicited copies of 
CJA to be distributed to inmates, and the regulation is narrowly tailored 
to only disallow unsolicited copies of the publication to be distributed. 
As such, summary judgment in favor of the prison defendants should 
have been affirmed. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
“The constitutional guarantee of a free press ‘assures the 
maintenance of our political system and an open society.’”192 
Furthermore, “the First and Fourteenth Amendments also protect the 
right of the public to receive such information . . . as . . . published.”193 
While prisoners are still afforded constitutional rights such as the right to 
receive information, they are not afforded the same liberties and 
freedoms as other members of the public. As such, there are restrictions 
on their constitutional rights. As evident in Thornburgh v. Abbott, one 
such limitation is the right to receive certain publications.
194
 If the 
publications are deemed to be “detrimental to the security, good order, or 
discipline of the institution or if it might facilitate criminal activity,” the 
 
191. See supra text accompanying note 180-83. 
192. Pell v. Procunier, 427 U.S. 817, 832 (1974) (quoting Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 
U.S. 374, 389 (1967)).  
193. Id. (citing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972)). 
194. 490 U.S. 401 (1989). 
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warden may reject it.
195
 Another limitation imposed upon prisoners is 
that a warden is permitted to reject publications that involve discussions 
of certain topics such as descriptions as to how a person can “construct[] 
or use . . . weapons, ammunition, [or] bombs.”196 The warden may also 
censor publications that “depict[], encourage[] or [explain how to] escape 
from [a] correctional facilit[y], or [if it] contains blueprints, drawings or 
similar descriptions of” correctional facilities.197 Therefore, it is evident 
that although prisoners still retain constitutional rights, those rights are 
subject to restrictions. 
In Hrdlicka v. Reniff, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the 
four-factor Turner test to determine whether publishers and inmates have 
a First Amendment right to receive and distribute unsolicited copies of 
CJA.
198
 The Turner test has been used in several previous cases to 
determine whether prisoners’ constitutional rights were violated; 
however, the Turner test, should not have been applied in Hrdlicka. The 
Turner Court stated that their task was to “formulate a standard of review 
for prisoners’ constitutional claims that is responsive both to the ‘policy 
of judicial restraint regarding prisoner complaints and [to] the need to 
protect constitutional rights.’”199 The test refers to prisoners’ claims and 
complaints, and the need to protect their rights. Since Hrdlicka brought 
the claim on behalf of himself, the publisher, and CJA, the publication, 
and there were no prisoners’ claims or complaints, the Turner test should 
not have been applied. 
In addition to the inapplicability of the Turner test, summary 
judgment in favor of the defendants should have been affirmed. As 
discussed earlier, prisons are not public fora, and thus are areas in which 
the government can restrict and regulate speech-related conduct. The 
distribution of CJA is one such example of speech-related conduct that 
the government should be able to regulate. Also, since prisons problems 
are often “complex and intractable,” courts should be deferential to 
prison administrators since they are the ones familiar and experienced 
with the intricacies of such issues and how best to deal with them.
200
 
 
195. Id. at 403 n.5 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 540.71(b) (2012)). 
196. 28 C.F.R. § 540.71(b)(1). 
197. Id. § 540.71(b)(2). 
198. 631 F.3d 1044, 1049-50 (9th Cir. 2011). 
199. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 85 (1987) (emphasis added) (quoting Procunier 
v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 406 (1974)). 
200. Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 229 (2001) (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 
416 U.S. 396, 404-05 (1974)). 
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Furthermore, since prisons are creatures of the legislative and executive 
branches of the government, the courts should respect the separation of 
powers and afford even more deference to prisons. Finally, the press 
does not have a constitutional right to access prisons. Although the First 
Amendment affords freedom to the press, there are restrictions, and one 
such limitation is access to prison inmates. Accordingly, the prison 
defendants in Hrdlicka should be awarded the right to regulate their 
prisons in the manner they wish, and the Ninth Circuit should have been 
deferential to prison policies. 
The test to determine whether a publisher’s First Amendment rights 
are violated by a prison regulation should be a two-part test: 1) does the 
regulation serve an important government objective; and 2) is the 
regulation narrowly tailored. The test should be limited to these two 
prongs because regulating a prison is a difficult job and one in which 
involves intricacies and complexities. Therefore, the courts should be 
deferential to prison administrators, and the test should reflect this 
deferential attitude. If the courts were to apply the aforementioned test, 
summary judgment should have been affirmed, as the prison stated 
several reasons for the regulation, such as security concerns, and the 
regulation is narrowly tailored as it only referred to unsolicited copies of 
the publication. Regardless of the test, however, Hrdlicka should not be 
allowed to distribute unsolicited copies of CJA to prison inmates, and 
summary judgment should have been affirmed. 
 
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss2/8
